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Abstract 
We study the relationship between voters' preferences and the emergence of party 
platforms in two-party democratic elections with adaptive parties. In the model, prefer­
ences of voters and the opposition party's platform determine an electoral landscape on 
which the challenging party must adaptively search for votes. We show that changes in 
the underlying distribution of voters' preferences result in different electoral landscapes 
which can be characterized by a measure of ruggedness. We find that locally adapt'ing 
parties converge to moderate platforms regardless of the landscape's ruggedness. Greater 
ruggedness, however, tempers a party's ability to find such platforms. Thus, we are able 
to establish a link between the distribution of voters' preferences and the responsiveness 
of adaptive parties. 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTOR AL 
LANDSCAPES 
Ken Kollman John H. Miller Scott E. Page 
1 Introduction 
An enduring concern of democratic theory is the extent to which electoral processes en­
courage political parties to respond to voters' preferences. Scholars have posed various 
hypotheses a.bout the relationship between voters' preferences and the behavior of parties. 
For some, sociological and public opinion research suggests that distinct voter ideologies 
and dispersed policy preferences cause party polarization (Duverger 1963; Sabata 1988; 
Phillips, 1990). Others rely on spatial election theories to explain party behavior. Spatial 
theories assume that office-seeking parties try to take policy positions that are as "close" 
to voters' preferences as possible. Under such an assumption, the distribution of voters' 
preferences would appear to be central. Downs (1957, p. 140), for example, referring 
to his single dimensional spatial model, claims "the distribution of voters is a crucial 
determinant molding a nation's political life . . .  [a.nd] major changes in it are among the 
most important political events possible." He asserts that unimodal preference distri­
butions lead parties to adopt similar or identical platforms, while bimodal distributions 
cause parties to adopt dramatically different platforms (p.118). More recent spatial mod­
els have modified Downs' conclusions. If complex preferences become compressed down 
to a single ideological dimension, regardless of modality, then parties converge toward 
moderate, or even identical platforms (Enelow and Hinich 1984) 
Unfortunately, though spatial models have provided a useful framework for explain­
ing several empirical observations, they have difficulty accounting for policy divergence, 
challenger parties that lose elections, and the observed stability of platforms in two-party 
systems. Consider the position-taking behavior of parties in the United States: they alter 
their messages to appeal to different sets of voters (B. Page 1978); they maintain policy 
distances from ea.ch other on some issues (such as abortion and gun control), and con­
verge to similar positions on other issues (such a.s foreign policy and social security); and 
they appear to modify their platforms when voters' preferences for policies change (Nie, 
Verba, and Petrocik, 1976; Sundquist, 1968.) Spatial voting models have not succeeded 
entirely in explaining such phenomena .  
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With more than one issue dimension, two-party systems have single-point equilib­
ria only if voters are distributed symmetrically-a severely restrictive condition (Plott, 
1967). If voters are distributed asymmetrica.lly, equilibrium sets, such as the top-cycle, 
uncovered, or minmax sets, can be large, or even encompass the whole space (Mcl{­
elvey, 1976; Kramer, 1977; Ordeshook, 1986; Schofield, Grofman, and Feld, 1988). Only 
McKelvey (1986) has addressed the connection between preference distributions and the 
outcomes of electoral competition. He formalizes a bound on the size of the uncovered 
set as a function of the amount of a.symmetry of voter preferences. His result states that 
less symmetry leads to a larger uncovered set. Therefore, a party with the capability 
of locating in the uncovered set has greater freedom to select platforms, creating the 
interpretation that less symmetric voter ideal points allow rational parties to select less 
moderate platforms. 
In this paper, we shall demonstrate with a. formal model how, under plausible as­
sumptions, the behavior of political parties changes when voters' preference distributions 
are altered. Following Kollman, Miller, and Page (1992), we use a model of two-party 
competition where parties a.re adaptive organizations competing for votes in a multi-
dimensional issue space. Parties respond to popularity polls by incrementally adapting 
their platforms. Our model explores the ability of parties, facing a variety of voters' pref­
erence distributions, to find winning platforms. We consider classes of voter preference 
distributions that vary in the level of ideological consistency and the strengths attached 
to moderate and extreme positions. 
In the model, preferences of voters and the opposition party's platform determine 
what we call an electoral landscape on which the challenging party adaptively searches for 
votes. We show that changes in the underlying distribution of voters' preferences result 
in different electoral landscapes that can be characterized by measures of ruggedness and 
slope. We find that locally adapting parties converge to moderate platforms regardless of 
the landscape's characteristics. \Ve also find that greater ruggedness, which is correlated 
with less slope, restricts a. party's ability to find such platforms. This leads to greater 
platform separation. Thus, we a.re able to establish a link between distributions of vot�rs' 
preferences and the responsiveness of adaptive parties. 
2 Adaptive Parties 
Standard spatial voting models, which rely on the assumption of fully-informed rational 
political actors, imply some disturbing conclusions. McKelvey (1976) shows that under 
quite general conditions, majority-supported policy proposals include the entire space of 
policy positions.1 Therefore, a. challenging party can always find a winning platform in 
a multi-dimensional issue space, and we would not expect systems of competing, fully­
informed rational parties to ever converge to stable platforms. Note also that a further 
1Specifically, lVlcKelvey shows that the top cycle set encompasses the entire space of platforms. This 
result pertains to the aggregation of preferences, and not the performance of a particular democratic 
institution. 
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implication of the fully-informed optimizing perspective is that a challenging party can 
always defeat an incumbent. 
In reality, parties may not a.ct "a.s if" they a.re fully-informed and capable of selecting 
an optimal platform. To account for party limitations, we consider parties that locally 
adapt from their current platform. There a.re several explanations which support �his 
assumption. First, a party may have limited information and foresight about voter 
preferences, so their search for new platforms may be severely restricted. Second, a party 
may be tethered to policy positions for ideological reasons, including the constraints of 
party activists and contributors (Aldrich and McGinniss, 1989). Third, voters may be 
wary of a party that moves a.cross the ideological spectrum quickly in search of votes. 
Finally, organizations tend to adhere closely to established norms and codes of behavior 
(Dahl and Lindblom, 1953), and thus a.re unlikely to engage in large platform changes. 
The picture that emerges is one of parties gathering information and choosing the 
best among those platforms that a.re "close" to their existing platforms. In this respect 
our model is similar in spirit to Schofield (1978), who demonstrated with a formal model 
that there always exists a. dense trajectory among winning platforms. That is, one can 
always find a sequence of close platforms that will lead a political party from one winning 
platform to the next. Thus, one might think that even with incrementally-changing 
parties the unsatisfying conclusions inherent in the fully-informed rational choice models 
still hold. In Schofield's model parties incrementally advance the incumbent 's platform 
as opposed to their own historically determined platform, which is the case in our model. 
It follows that if parties begin with platforms that are not spatially close to one another, 
then our model and Schofield's model may lead to very different dynamic trajectories. 
To understand adaptive party behavior, we follow the approach suggested by Holland 
and Miller (1991) and analyze the behavior of parties using artificial adaptive agents 
(AAA). Using AAA models, we can investigate the relationship between optimization 
and adaptation. AAA models allow us to create an "artificial world" in which we can 
explore systems of flexible, well-defined agents, and quickly generate, refine and test new 
hypotheses. In these models, one attempts to discover the generic patterns of system 
behavior that emerge due to the adaptation. 2 
Once one accepts the notion that parties a.re limited in their ability to find appealing 
platforms, new research questions emerge. The local environment facing each party- the 
link between small modification in a. party's platform and the number of votes the party 
receives-now becomes central. Recall that the preferences of voters and the opposition 
party's platform determine the number of votes a party receives. As parties adapt new, 
nearby platforms in an attempt to capture votes, they alter the environment facing the 
other party. In this pa.per, we investigate the dynamic interplay of platforms. What 
routes do the parties follow? Do they "move" towards similar places in platform space? 
Do they ever get stuck on local optima.? How quickly do they move? How normatively 
2In the complex systems Ii terat.ure, these resulting pat.terns of system level behavior are often referred 
to as emergent phenomena. 
appealing are the resulting outcomes - are the platforms selected by adaptive parties 
better than arbitrarily chosen platforms? 
3 The Model 
Following standard spatial models, our voters have perfect information about parties' 
platforms. Each voter attaches an integer valued strength and ideal position to each 
issue. Strength measures the issue's relative importance to the voter. A voter considers 
an issue irrelevant if the voter's strength is equal to zero on that issue. The ideal position 
denotes the voter's preferred position. 
Thus, an integer valued vector of length 2n (where n equals the number of issues) 
fully characterizes a voter's preferences. There are k E {O, 1, ... , k-1} positions on each 
issue and s E { 0, 1, ... , s -1} strengths. The utility to a voter from a party's platform, 
y E {O, 1, . . .  , k - l} n, equa1s the negative of the squared weighted Euclidean distance,
with weights determined by strengths. Let Sji denote the strength and Xji the ideal point
� of the jth voter on the ith issue. A voter's utility from platform y is then given by
n 
Uj(y) = -L Sji(Xji - Yi)2• i=l 
A voter casts a ballot for the party \Vhose platform generates the higher utility, and the 
party obtaining the most votes wins the election. 
We begin an electoral sequence with the creation of two randomly assigned initial 
party platforms. These a.re referred to as party idea.I points. One party is arbitrarily 
chosen to be the incumbent, and its platform remains fixed during the first election. 
During the campaign prior to each election, the challenger party tests platform variations 
using polls of randomly selected voters.3 After this polling, the challenger party chooses 
the platform that maximizes its expected vote total. The parties then compete for 
election and the winning party becomes the fixed incumbent for the next election. The 
losing party becomes the challenger and undertakes polls in order to determine a winning 
platform. Often parties fa.ii to locate winning platforms after the finite campaign. If so, 
the incumbent remains, and the challenger adapts another new platform. This sequence 
of adaptations and elections continues through several elections. 
3.1 Adaptive Search Techniques 
Our parties adapt to polling information using three benchmarks of adaptive behavior: a 
genetic algorithm, hill-clim.bing, and random. search. 4 A genetic algorithm is a population 
3In Kollman, :Miller, and Page (1992), parties were able to poll all voters. 
40ur use of three different search algorithms ensures more robust results. We have chosen algorithms 
which satisfy two criteria. F irst, they have been widely used in discrete nonlinear optimization, which 
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based adaptive search algorithm that mimics evolutionary learning (Holland 1975). A 
genetic algorithm begins with a randomly generated population of platforms similar to the 
party's existing platform. These platforms are then selectively reproduced biased toward 
those that fair better against the incumbent party's platform. A random subset of the 
reproduced platforms then undergo an exchange of sequences of positions (crossover) 
and arbitrary changes on some positions (mutation) . The platforms are then tested 
against the incumbent 's platform and a new cycle of reproduction and modification is 
begun. Each application of the algorithm is referred to as a generation, and the number 
of generations corresponds to two units of campaign length. Hill-climbing operates on 
a single platform rather than a population of platforms. At each step, the algorithm 
randomly generates and tests a new platform in the neighborhood of the current platform. 
If the new platform is better than the current one, it becomes the new current platform. 
This process continues with each generation and test of a platform counting as one unit 
of campaign length. Random search generates multiple platforms in the neighborhood 
of the existing platform and chooses the best one. Under random search, every !few 
platform generated is considered one unit of campaign length. For each algorithm, we 
experimented with campaign lengths of between ten and one hundred. 
The three adaptive techniques offer plausible analogs to party search behavior. The 
genetic algorithm approximates the process of a political party undergoing internal de­
bate over policy positions. Candidates borrow ideas from each other and win or lose 
primaries based on how they match up against the incumbent. Occasionally an activist 
introduces a new idea .  Hill-climbing is intended to represent a party that fine-tunes the 
policy positions of its candidate using polling results and focus groups. Random search 
represents a party that chooses the best candidate from among volunteers. The random 
search algorithm is not a. flattering metaphor of party decision ma.king, but we believe 
that it offers a possible lower bound on organizational intelligence. 
3.2 Preference Distributions 
We consider two major classes of preference distributions: those where voters maintain 
varying levels of consistency a.cross ideological positions, and those with systematic vari­
ations in issue strength. \Ve alter voters' preferences by correlating voters' ideal positibns 
on different issues and by correlating a given issue's strength and position. Correlating 
voter's ideal positions on different issues alters what we call an ideology. Voters can have 
uniform ideologies, ·where their ideal positions are uniformly distributed across all issues, 
or they can have consistent ideologies, where ideal positions are correlated across issues. 
To create consistent ideologies, we randomly assign an ideological base to each voter and 
require that all ideal positions on other issues lie within one position of the base. For 
example, if the ideological base for a voter is 3, then all ideal positions lie in the set 
provides us with priors on their performance. Second, as we suggest in the next section, each algorithm 
represents a plausible description of how parties might select. plat.forms. 
,5 
{2, 3, 4}. 5 
We also considered three types of correlations between strengths a.nd ideal positions: 
independent, centrist, or extremist preferences. With independent preferences, a voter's 
strengths on issues are independent of the voter's ideal positions on issues. Centrist 
preferences occur when a voter a.tta.ches greater strengths to issues with moderate ideal 
positions, and extremist preferences occur when voters attach greater strengths to those 
issues with extreme idea.I positions. To illustrate, consider the case of nine positions 
per issue {O, 1, . . .  , 8} and three strengths {O, 1, 2}. Centrist voters assign high strength 
( s = 2) to issues with idea.I positions {3, 4, 5}, low strength ( s = 1) to issues with idea.I 
positions in {1, 2, 6, 7}, and no strength (s = 0) to issues with ideal positions {O, 8} . 
In extremist preference distributions, voters attach greatest strength to issues on which 
they have extreme ideal positions. Issues with idea.I positions in {O, 1, 7, 8}, receive high 
strength (s = 2),issues in {2, 3, 5, 6} receive low strength (s = 1), and an issue with ideal 
position {4} is considered by the voter to be irrelevant (s = 0). Since there are two 
types of ideologies a.nd three types of strength-idea.I position correlations, we consider six 
possible distributions of voter preferences: 
Table 1 here 
As should be evident, these preference profiles a.re neither complete nor empirically 
accurate pictures of political attitudes. Rather, they suggest a set of biases voters might 
have when they decide how to vote. Our extremist voters place substantial weight on 
certain subsets of issues on which they ta.ke extreme views. One may think of abort1on 
or gun control activists in the United States a.s extremist voters: the competing parties 
positions on these voters' pet issue ha.s a. huge impact on whom these voters support. 
In contrast, our centrist voters pla.ce little weight on issues on which they ha.ve extreme 
views. For.example, on issues such a.s the reciting of the pledge of allegiance, funding for 
the arts, or the personal life of a. party's candidate, voters may prefer positions outside 
of the mainstream and yet not attach much weight to these issues. 
3.3 Measures of Party Performance 
In section 5, we analyze the formation of platforms when adaptive parties face voters with 
various preference distributions. Ultimately, we want to know how parties, in their efforts 
5If a voter's ideal base position lied on the boundary, in this case in the set 0,8, then all other 
ideal positions were within one position of the ideal base position but only in one direction. We also 
experimented with another version of ideological voters. For these voters, we randomly selected an initial 
issue (issue 1) and its ideal position, and then requiring the next issue (issue 2) to have an ideal position 
within plus or minus one the previous issue's ideal position. In turn, a voter's ideal position on issue 
3 had to be within one of her isst1e 2 ideal position and so on. The results for this type of ideological 
preferences proved indistinguishable from those generated by the consistent ideology described in 'the 
text. 
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to attract votes, move a.cross the platform space. To facilitate this analysis, we measure 
party movement and platform responsiveness in a variety of ways. Over the series of 
elections, we trace the trajectory of winning party platforms based on several measures. 
In the definitions, we refer to the platform Ymedian, which consists of the median position 
on each issue. For example, if 3 is the median position on issue 2 then Ymedian,2 is set 
equal to 3. 
Separation equals the Euclidean distance between the current platforms of the two parties. 
Distance from 111edian equals the Euclidean distance between the winning party's plat­
form and Ymedian. 
Centrality of a platform y equals 
Lf=l 1lj(Ymedian)
I:f=1 uj(y) 
where V equals the number of voters. 
This normalization sets cenfrahty(Ymedian) = 1. Though we attach no normative 
significance to the median itself as an outcome, higher centrality means that the platform 
is closer to the weighted center of voters' preferences. Centralities close to one represent 
strong utilitarian outcomes. Note, however, that centralities across different distributions 
of voters' preferences cannot be compared directly because each preference distribution 
generates a distinct centrality distribution. 
4 The Electoral Landscape 
Adaptive parties attempt to improve their vote totals by searching locally over the space 
of platforms. Recall that the percentage of the vote a platform receives depends on 
the incumbent 's platform and the preferences of the voters. To explain adaptive parties' 
responses, we introduce the notion of an electoral landscape. Like geographic landscapes, 
electoral landscapes have points of high and low elevation. By assigning each platform 
an elevation equal to the percentage of the vote won by the platform, we can interpret 
party behavior as a. search for (electoral, not necessarily moral!) high ground. 
Notions of electoral landscapes are implicit in models with fully-informed, rational 
parties, but the landscape's underlying structure a.re usually ignorecl.6 In these models, 
6The aforementioned work of l'vlckelvey (1986) and Schofield (1978) are notable exceptions. 
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agents are able to perform vast surveys of the landscape and to move immediately to .the 
point of highest elevation. In our model, a.gents are able to only look locally and must 
move slowly. Thus, the explicit details of the landscape become an important feature of 
our model. 
Adaptive parties' knowledge of the electoral landscape is constrained in two ways. 
First, they poll only a sample of the electorate and not all voters. Therefore, a platform's 
elevation, as perceived by the party, may differ from its actual elevation. Of particular 
importance is when the error ca.used by sampling results in the incorrect ranking of two 
platforms, as when an actual decrease in votes is perceived a.s an increase, or vice versa. 
Second, adaptive parties do not have estimates of all platforms. In the simulations we 
discuss, the number of polls never exceeds one hundred, which, in ea.ch case, represents 
substantially less than 1 % of all platforms. 
Figures 1 and 2 provide intuition on the impact of the electoral landscape on platform 
formation. These figures represent projections of two issue dimensions (from a. multi­
dimensional problem) on to a. voting landscape for centrist and extremist preferences 
respectively. The horizontal axes represent different platform positions on issues one and 
two (with all other issue positions fixed). The altitude gives the percentage of the vote 
received by the party if it advocates the corresponding pair of issue positions. In pur 
model, a party finds itself located somewhere on the horizontal plane, and is allowed to 
perform local searches for better platforms. Hill-climbing parties, for example, take a 
sequence of random "steps" and move when the new location is higher than the old. If 
the landscape is smooth with a. single peak, then such steps would lead parties to a similar 
platform regardless of where the party started. If, however, the landscape is rugged, such 
steps could ca.use parties to be trapped on isolated local peaks, unable to cross adjacent 
valleys and ascend to superior platforms. It follows that we may see adaptive parties 
with substantial platform separation. 
Figure 1 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
We conclude this section with a description of the formation of electoral landscapes, 
which provides intuition as to how variations in the distribution of voter preferences 
alters the slope and the ruggedness of electoral landscapes. We begin with the case of 
a single voter and a projection of policy preferences onto a two-dimensional issue space. 
In Figure 3, v is the ideal point for the single voter and YI denotes the incumbent's fixed 
platform. Using the voter's utility function we can draw an indifference ellipse (I-llipse), 
such that for all points on the I-llipse the voter achieves utility equal to that given by YI·
Given the utility function the voter achieves greater utility from platforms that are closer 
to v, thus the challenger will win the vote if and only if its platform is contained within 
the I-llipse. An I-llipse, 10, is shown in Figure 3 for the case when the two platforms offer 
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the voter identical utility on the issues not projected on the diagram. If the incumbent's 
platform offers a different utility level on the unprojected issues, then the I-llipse can be 
easily adjusted to reflect this differential (it will lie interior of I0 if the unprojected issues 
favor the incumbent and exterior of Io if they favor the challenger). 
Figure 3 ab01ti here 
Now, to form the electoral landscape, draw the appropriate I-llipse for each voter. The 
"elevation" of each platform is given by the percent of all possible I-llipses that contain 
the platform. Alternatively, one could view the creation of the landscape as a process by 
which the interior of each I-llipse is coated with a thick layer of paint (signifying a vote 
for the challenger). Areas of great elevation, i.e. with many layers of paint, correspond 
to regions of the issue space which attract many votes. 
Different preference patterns create distinct I-llipses and, perforce, fundamentally 
different electoral landscapes. For example, high strength for a particular issue implies 
I-llipses tha.t are elongated along the other issue dimension. That is, with high strength 
voters prefer to stay close to their ideal position on that issue, while compromising on 
other less important issues. Under extremist preferences, the high strength. issues are 
those with ideal points near the edge of the diagram, and thus one would expect to find 
elongated I-llipses (running parallel to the nearest edge) in these areas (see Figure 4a). 
Under centrist preferences, the I-llipses will elongate for those ideal positions near the 
middle of the axis. These I-llipses will elongate para.llel to the other issue axis (see Figure 
4b). 
Figures 4 a, 4 b about here 
Extremist and centrist preferences imply very different landscapes. With extremist 
preferences, the I-llipses formations result in numerous areas of high elevation that are 
sparsely distributed across the landscape (near the corners). These landscapes will there­
fore have substantial ruggedness. Centrist preferences create landscapes that have a lot 
of overlap occurring a.cross the middle of the two axes. This causes a landscape to be 
formed with a, single, central peak. Independent preferences have less regularity than 
the other two types we consider, as strengths and ideal points a.re uncorrelated. Thus, 
the shape of the I-llipses are unconstrained by the voter's ideal point. This results in a 
landscape formed by combining voters of all different types of characteristics, and thus 
one can think of a. convolution of the various landscapes types discussed above, along 
with other forms of asymmetric I-llipses not discussed above. 
Finally, we want to consider landscapes formed by ideologically consistent voters. 
Our analysis is simplified by the fact these voters have ideal positions that are near one 
another on ea.ch issue: their idea.I points lie along or near the n-dimensional diago�al. 
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Since our centrist and extremist preferences both tie the strength to the ideal point, such 
voters will have ideal points with similar strengths, and therefore will have circular I­
llipses. The radius of such I-llipses will be large towards the extremes and small towa':rds 
the center for centrist voters, and the opposite for extremists. Further, the compression 
of the voter ideal points in a small region of the space causes greater regularity. For 
independent preferences this will smooth the landscape appreciably. In sum, ideological 
consistent voters should dampen the ruggedness across all types of landscapes. 
5 Results 
In an effort to ensure robust findings, we ran simulations of the model for all six com­
binations of preference distributions over a range of parameter values. In the findings 
presented below, we analyze the model when there a.re ten issues (n = 10), nine posi­
tions per issue (k = 9),three strengths per issue (s = 3), and campaigns of length 40.7 
Strengths and positions a.re correlated as described in section 3. The results presented 
a.re from an environment with 2501 voters and in which parties' polls sample a random 
� selection of 251 voters.8 All of the result.s reported here appear robust to reasonable
changes in the parameter values. 
To foreshadow the results, we find that adaptive parties evolve moderate platforms 
that are spatially separate from one another a.cross all types of preference distributions. 
We also find that platform evolution, in particular the type of platform and speed of con­
vergence, does depend on the underlying preference distribution. Our analysis unfolds in 
two stages. We first show that variations in preferences result in fundamentally different 
electoral landscapes. Then we find a link between landscape characteristics and adaptive 
party behavior. 
We characterize electoral landscapes according to two characteristics, ruggedness and 
slope. Ruggedness equa.ls the percentage of positions in the interior which a.re one­
dimensional local maxima or minima .. A platform has a one-dimensional local maximum 
(minimum) on an issue i a.t interior position /,� if when holding the rest of the platform 
unchanged, no increase in votes occurs when altering issue i's position to either k + 1 
or k - 1. Intuitively, more ruggedness should lead to slower adaptation, as parties are 
more likely to get trapped in local optima .. 9 vVe consider two measures of slope, both of 
which rely on the notion of a 1-neighbor platform. The set of 1-neighbors of a platform y 
consists of those platforms which differ from y by exactly one position on exactly one issue. 
7These parameters were chosen to be consistent with existing empirical research, although they are 
within ranges where we observed no qualitative changes in outcomes. For example, we experimented 'Yith 
campaign lengths between 10 and 100. We also considered ideological parties: those that contingent on 
winning the election try to stay close to their initial "ideal" platform. The results for ideological parties 
generally agree with those reported here. 
8These numbers create a sampling error of approximately 5%. 
9Ruggedness is a perhaps the simplest measure of the complexity of a landscape. For a discussion of 
the complexity of discrete function spaces and alternative complexity measures see Page (1993). 
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The average slope of a landscape equals the average difference (in absolute value) in vote 
total between a platform and its 1-neighbors. The gradient equals the average maximum 
vote difference between a platform and its 1 -neighbors. We found ruggedness and both 
measures of slope to be inversely related. Given this inverse relationship; hereafter, we 
focus our discussion on the ruggedness of landscapes.10 
Figure 5 gives the average ruggedness across the different types of preference dis­
tributions. The preferences can be listed in order from those that form the most to 
the least rugged landscapes as follows: Independent- Uniform, Independent- Consistent1 
Extremist- Uniform, Extremist-Consistent, Cenfrist- Uniform, and Centrist- Consistent.11 
The intuition outlined in the previous section appears valid: centrist preferences form 
landscapes that are the least rugged while independent preferences form the most rugged 
landscapes. Consistency of preferences reduces ruggedness across all landscape types. 
Note that as the parties evolve their platforms, ruggedness declines slightly, implying 
that extreme parties move toward moderate platforms slower than parties already near 
the "center" of voters' preferences. \Vi th these measures of landscape characteristics we 
can now analyze party behavior. 
Figure 5 about here 
A central finding is that adaptive parties tend to move toward moderate platforms 
regardless of the distribution of voters' preferences and the search algorithm employed. 
Figure 6 illustrates this result for hill-climbing parties.12 For all types of preferences, 
adaptive parties, even when limited to sample polls of voters, quickly move to regions of 
high social utility. In every case, by the fourth election winning parties' platforms were 
located within the top 1 % of all platforms as measured by centrality. This tendency to 
adapt platforms of high social utility does not imply platform convergence in the formal 
sense. The resulting platforms, although close to the median, often advocate positions 
that are away from the median on particular issues. 
Figure 6 about here 
Party platforms also maintain a degree of spatial distance from one another (see Figure 
7) and do not appear to lock into "equilibrium" positions. Though party platforms tend
toward moderate regions, they continually wander these neighborhoods. Moreover, the 
rate at which parties adapt toward the central region, as well as the region's spatial radius 
10The inverse relationship can be verified by measuring the correlation coefficients between the two 
measures of slope and ruggedness. For example, with hillclimbing parties after the fourth election the 
correlation coefficient bet.ween average slope and ruggedness was -0.245 for landscapes formed by voters 
with Independent-Uniform preferences. Similar results hold for other preference distributions. 
110nly the differences between centrist. and ot.her distributions are statistically significant at 95%. 
12Similar results hold for parties who adapt using genetic algorithms and random search. 
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vary according to the electoral landscape. This second feature echoes McKelvey's (1976) 
aforementioned theoretic result a.nd ca.n be observed in Figure 7 with the flattening of 
the lines at different levels of separation. 
We also find that adaptive parties cannot alwa.ys locate winning platforms. The 
probability of winning decreases with the number of elections, from approximately 100% 
of the time in the first election down to approximately 25% (on average) by the tenth 
election. While optimization models require explicit assumptions about incumbency 
advantages, here such an a.dva.nta.ge emerges a.s a natural outcome of the adaptive search 
process. As the platforms evolve, the landscape facing each party changes. As shown 
above, our examples indicate that there is some decrease in ruggedness, which would 
imply that it is easier for adaptive parties to travel a.round the landscape without getting 
trapped on local pea.ks. However, our examples also show that the slope is decreasing over 
time, implying greater difficulty in increasing vote totals for a. given platform alteration. 
Figure 7 about here. 
Figures 6 and 7 also indicate that landscape characteristics effect adaptive party 
behavior. Linking the behavior observed in these figures, with the underlying landscape 
characteristics, we find that in general, landscapes with lower ruggedness allow faster 
adaptation to more moderate platforms that a.re closer to one other. Thus, centrist 
preferences will ca.use competing parties to adapt very moderate platforms that are near 
one another, while independent or extremist preferences keep party platforms spatially 
separated with less moderation. The more rugged the landscape, the more likely parties 
are to get caught on local optima. Thus, on these landscapes initial positions will be 
very important and path dependent behavior will emerge. 
Several other characteristics of the platforms deserve attention. One question regard­
ing consistent voters was whether they compel parties to a.da.pt more consistent platforms. 
If so, parties would converge to platforms with symmetric positions a.cross all of the is­
sues. We find little support for this hypothesis in our numerical simulations: adaptive 
parties do not become significantly more consistent when adapting on landscapes formed 
by consistent voters.13 
The three search algorithms differ in their abilities to adapt platforms on rugged 
landscapes. Genetic algorithms have been promoted by many researchers primarily be-
13To test this we introduced the following measure of consistency: 
c(x) = 1 - va1'(x) ,A1axva1' 
where val'( x) is the variance of the positions in the platform x, and M axvai· equals the highest possible 
platform variance Consistency always lies on the unit interval and varies inversely with the variance in 
the platform's positions. We found no significant differences in the consistency of platforms for parties 
confronting consistent and uniform ideologies. 
1 2  
cause they perform well on complex, nonlinear problems (Holland 1975). Similar to other 
population based search techniques, genetic algorithms identify and attempt to exploit 
patterns present in good solutions, in this case good platforms. It comes as no surprise 
that on more rugged landscapes the genetic algorithm performs comparatively be�ter 
than the other two techniques Hill-climbing parties often get caught at a local optima, 
never visiting more attractive regions of platform space. Finally, though random search 
adapts most slowly on a simple single peaked landscape, it often outperforms hill-climbing 
on more rugged landscapes because it samples a larger number of initial points before 
taking its step, so it is more likely to take high payoff paths initially.14 Our examples 
show that parties using genetic algorithms adapt more quickly away from their initial 
platform than do those using hill-climbing or random search. Nevertheless, by the tenth 
election, all types of parties have adapted approximately the same distance away from 
their initial platforms. 
6 Discussion 
To summarize our findings, the ability of adaptive parties to locate winning platforms 
depends on the ruggedness and slope of electoral landscapes. \"le find that extremist and 
independent preferences lead to slower party convergence than centrist preferences, and 
that consistent ideologies lea.cl to slower pa.rty convergence, especially when preferences 
are centrist. Moreover, locally adapting and spatially separated parties can often becqme 
temporarily stuck a.t local pea.ks, and thus be unable to defeat an incumbent. These 
findings appear to hold for a wide range of para.meter values. 
The increased ruggedness of landscapes formed by extremist preferences and consis­
tent ideologies ma.y explain some reluctance by contemporary American parties to budge 
from platform positions. \\Then voters attach greatest strength to those issues on which 
they take extreme views, or when ideologica.l consistent voters loom large in campaigns, 
parties appear to converge slowly to moderate positions. On issues where voters attach 
more significance to centrist positions, parties appear to adapt quickly to similar, moder­
ate positions. By relating different preference distributions to party behavior, our model 
can lead to more fundamental theories of elections. Moreover, relationships between 
preferences and outcomes should lend themselves to empirical testing. 
While extremist preferences and consistent ideologies tend to create more rugged elec­
toral landscapes, in genera.I, convergence results in spatial voting models with adaptive 
14Hill- climbing and random search are similar in t.hat they both randomly sample from their current 
best known position and move to bett.er positions. The difference is that random search first samples a 
large number of neighboring points and then takes the best one, while hill-climbing samples sequentially 
and moves as soon as a better point emerges. Thus, for a given number of samples, hill-climbing wilJ be 
able to move further uphill if I.here is a smooth single-peaked landscape. However, if the landscape is 
rugged, hill-climbing can take off in the wrong direction and get stuck, while random search will move 
slower, but each step has a much higher probability of having a greater increase in value. Note that 
when there are few uphill direct.ions, both algorithms behave in a similar manner. 
13 
parties seem relatively robust to changes in voters' preference distributions. Even extrem­
ist preferences and consistent ideologies lead to parties taking fairly moderate platforms 
within a few elections. Our findings tend to support Down's analytical intuition that 
in two-party democratic elections, rational parties tend to move toward moderate plat­
forms. To infer moderate voter preferences from an electoral system with two moderate 
parties may be a mistake. Political moderation and slight party separation in two-party 
systems might be as much attributable to the structural incentives imposed by the demo­
cratic process as to the moderation of voters' preferences. Though the notion of adaptive 
parties competing on an electoral landscape contrasts with the more traditional notion 
of rational parties optimally locating in an issue space, we view the two approaches as 
complementary. The robustness of rational actor models can be tested with more flexi­
ble AAA modeling techniques. Especially when models become complex, and analytical 
solutions become difficult or impossible to derive, numerical experiments offer a helpful 
alternative. We envision these techniques as having the potential to open up new areas 
for investigation and as a complement to traditional methods. 
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